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Air War College Air University The comments of the respective presidents highlight the contentious and tension filled relationship between the United States and Iran. Iran's association with the U.S. since the end of WWII has occupied two distinct poles. At first, a staunch ally under the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Shah of Iran) for over three decades, Iran has since been Washington's relentless antagonist since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which brought Ayatollah Khomeini and his Islamic state and ideological followers to power. This paper will explore Iran's main instrument of power to confront those who seek to influence its policies and change its clerical regime-the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC's conventional and asymmetrical military power, direct support from the Supreme Leader, constitutional authority, control and development of the Iran's chemical, biological and nuclear production programs, growing economic and political influence has enable the organization to emerged as the principle center of gravity in maintaining the existence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and protecting it from both internal and external threats.
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Introduction
Ayatollah Khomeini formed the IRGC in May 1979 by combining several revolutionary organizations that supported his ideology. Khomeini realized he needed such an organization after several attacks were carried out against some of his key leaders during the early months of the revolution and his distrust of Iran's regular military forces. The IRGC quickly grew to over 100,000 within a year and now stands at approximately 125,000. 1 In addition, the IRGC has become a relatively complex and cohesive organization, which has not lost its ideological enthusiasm.
In Iran's strategic position and influence in the region has benefited from a multitude of events, causing a weakening in the effectiveness of Washington's foreign policies. These events include, the U.S.'s ongoing troubled and expensive war in Iraq, a seemingly endless war in which enable the Iran to circumvent policies attempting to weaken or contain their terrorist and nuclear programs.
In the continuing development of these events, it is important for the U.S. to reassess its policies with respect to Iran and implement a new engagement policy framework to eliminate or weaken the clerics' iron grip on the political election system allowing a moderate political system to evolve, break the influence of the IRGC, the most powerful interest group in Iran and protector of the clerical regime, and foster the release of the voice and freedoms of Iran's population, especially its youth. Unfortunately, a country like the United States, with the biggest economy and the most power military force in the world, the road of engagement with Iran will likely be bumpy, filled with danger, and seem to have a destination with no arrival time. Today we encounter an Iran showing a growing willingness to confront Washington, other world powers, and international organization in the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military arenas. an Ayatollah Khomeini protégé who was later considered by the U.S. as a moderate due to his pro-market economic policies, used the IRGC forces to brutally and quickly suppressed the riots by killing and jailing some students. The IRGC also organized mass rallies in support of the government to counter the internal and external criticism. After the 1999 student riots, 24 IRGC commanders issued a stern warning to reformist President Khatami they would "take matters into their own hands if the anti-regime unrest continued." 11 This showed that the IRGC leadership had the confidence and ability to intimidate the Iranian President, and informed him his policies would be contained by force if they caused public dissent against the revolutionary government.
The Beginning of the IRGC
For the first 20 years of the IRGC, it was clear the organization created to protect the Islamic state was not only effectively accomplishing its constitutional mandates, but was doing so in a bold and brutal fashion motivated possibly by its own self interests. But are their other motives that guide the internal and external policies and subsequent actions of the IRGC? First, nationalism could be a foundational element to the motives of the IRGC. Their nationalism could be generated by Iran's history of foreign invasion or interference in its government. 
Regular Forces of the IRGC
At its beginning, the IRGC was unstructured, lightly armed, and heavily factionalized.
As the IRGC moved forward through the Iran-Iraq War and the reformist movements, it emerged with a force today estimated at over 125,000 men, with roughly 100,000 ground forces, 20,000 naval forces, 5,000 marines, and a small air branch composed of mostly small tactical aircraft and ballistic missiles. 13 The capabilities and organizational strength of the IRGC was possible 12 Connell, Michael, Alireza Nader, and Jacob Boyars. enemies will to fight. Change is often difficult, but the decision to change the IRGC's strategy was made easier by Iran's poor economic conditions putting pressure on limiting military expenditures, realizing the Islamic Republic could never match the conventional power of the U.S., and seeing the successes of resent asymmetrical warfare in Lebanon and Iraq.
The IRGC ground forces have recently shifted investments to "anti-tank" and "anti helicopter" weapons, expanded its command and control structure using a fiber optic transmission structure, and changed training practices emphasizing "decentralized partisan and guerrilla warfare." 16 In addition, the IRGC has "created some 3,000 special units or cells consisting of three to four soldier" designed to blend into the population of the cities and villages that have been overrun, and attack enemy lines of communications. 17 These small teams would also have the ability to travel to neighboring states or internationally to carry out terrorist attacks. Republic and the IRGC are playing a dangerous game of chess and seems to be taking every opportunity to improve their position while Washington is transitioning to another administration, the U.S. is tied down with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the world is focused on a world economic crisis. government. In addition, it shows Islamic clerics hold the Revolution's principles and instruments of power closely, and is systematic and selects when and when not to employ them.
Al-Quds Forces of the IRGC
Basij Mustazafin of the IRGC
The In this post-9/11 world, an "Axil of Evil" designation by the U.S.,
Washington's demonstrated willingness to eliminate regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the current U.S. Nation Security Strategy, these development are likely steering the Islamic Republic toward a "conservative alignment to better defend against the influence of the reformist opposition and the interventionist policies" of the west.
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The conservatives and IRGC can also be critical of their own, and President
Ahmadinejad's has not been an exception. He has been criticized recently for the failure of Iran's economic progress, for his comments denying the Jewish Holocaust ever occurred during WWII, and calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map." President Ahmadinejad's policies and comments are seen by those critical of the President as motivating the U.S. and other nations to increase economic and political pressure on Iran. His outrageous comments have also given the international community, even more than his domestic critics, plenty of "verbal and diplomatic ammunition" to criticize his presidency. Other signs President Ahmadinejad's power might be waning, is the Supreme leader enacted several decrees "restricting Ahmadinejad's executive 
IRGC's Growing Economic Power
The IRGC has grown its military and political power, but has increasingly positioned itself to be a major economic powerhouse within Iran. The Guard has become an economic cartel involved in a broad array of businesses to include defense manufacturing, oil and gas production, pharmaceutical, banks, real estate, and smuggling of black market items such as In another example, the youth defy clothing restrictions by not wearing the hejab (religious veil for women), participating in late-night parties with western music, drinking, dancing, drug use and promiscuity. 44 Unless a leader could survive the persecution of the IRGC and the conservative clerics, it is unlikely the general population could "spark" another revolution to cause a regime change in the near future.
Any comprehensive plan to change the actions of the Islamic regime or the IRGC would also have to consider the economic instrument of power. To this date, there is little evidence Iran can be influenced by economic pressure such as sanctions, even though it would seem simple with a country relying mainly on one source of funding. The Iranian economy, by some estimates is 85 percent reliant on the oil and gas industry. 
